Abstract: To better understand household hurricane evacuation decisions, this paper addresses a limitation to existing hurricane evacuation modeling aspects by developing a dynamic model of hurricane evacuation behavior. A household's evacuation decision is framed as an optimal stopping problem where every potential evacuation time period prior to the actual hurricane landfall, the household's optimal choice is to either evacuate, or to wait one more time period for a revised hurricane forecast. We build a realistic multiperiod model of evacuation that incorporates actual forecast and evacuation cost data for our designated Gulf of Mexico region. Results from our multiperiod model are calibrated with existing evacuation timing data from a number of hurricanes. Given the calibrated dynamic framework, a number of policy questions that plausibly affect the timing of household evacuations are analyzed, and a deeper understanding of existing empirical outcomes in regard to the timing of the evacuation decision is achieved.
Introduction
As moving water causes most hurricane-related fatalities, much of the decline in hurricane fatalities since 1950 (Kunkel et al. 1999; Rappaport 2000; Sadowski and Sutter 2005; Blake et al. 2007 ) is attributed to improvements in hurricane forecasts and warnings that have allowed for more timely evacuations (and hence less fatalities) from storm-surge zones (Rappaport 2000; Willoughby et al. 2007 ). The decline in fatalities is even more noteworthy when considering the fact that population in high hurricane risk coastal areas has grown significantly over this identical timeframe. However, this population increase must be further stressed, for despite the fact that the overall lethality of hurricanes has declined in recent decades, the potential risk for amplified casualties and/or injuries has actually increased because of the growing coastal populations (Centrec 2007) . The fatality numbers from Hurricane Katrina alone in 2005 were approximately 9,000 times higher than the annual mean fatality rate of 20, and consequently provide a poignant example of this high-risk reality, and more prominently of the critical role of evacuation.
Despite the critical role that timely evacuation plays in lowering hurricane and storm surge fatalities, an understanding of household evacuation is deemed to be "extremely limited" (Dash and Gladwin 2007) from an overall perspective, and even more so when considering the incorporation of temporal aspects of the evacuation decision-making process (Dash and Gladwin 2007; Gladwin et al. 2007) . In their overview of social science research needs related to hurricane forecasts and warnings, Gladwin et al. (2007) highlight the need for research that leads to the "… modeling of evacuation behavioral response in more precise and comprehensive ways," including capturing the dynamic nature of microscopic individualized (i.e., households) decision-making.
To better understand household hurricane evacuation, the purpose of this paper is to develop a dynamic model of hurricane evacuation behavior that models evacuation behavioral response to hurricane forecasts in a way that captures the intertemporal aspects of the evacuation decision process. Specifically, a household's evacuation decision is framed as an optimal stopping problem where every potential evacuation time period prior to the actual hurricane landfall, the household's optimal choice is either to evacuate, or to wait one more time period for a revised hurricane forecast. We build a realistic multiperiod model of evacuation that is calibrated by using existing forecast and evacuation cost data for coastal areas on the Gulf of Mexico. Then, we show how the model can help explain actual evacuation behavior from specific hurricanes, and expected evacuation timing outcomes for various household types. Finally, and most significantly, this dynamic framework is used to explore a number of relevant policy questions that plausibly affect the timing of household evacuations, and sometimes provides the rationalization for seemingly counterintuitive poststorm assessment evacuation results. For example, why does implementing contraflow actually cause some households to be less likely to evacuate? Whitehead (2003) estimates the probability of evacuation for varying levels of hurricane intensity, but does so from a static perspective, because the timing of the probability of an evacuation for any particular storm intensity level is not addressed. However, the evacuation decision when faced by a hurricane threat has the three qualities of irreversibility, uncertainty, and the ability to wait for more information that characterize a decision process that is better understood from a dynamic modeling approach (Dixit and Pindyck 1994) . Standard empirical results from the evacuation literature such as the traditional S-shaped evacuation response curves (USACE 2006a) clearly indicate that certain households wait, while others evacuate, and therefore further underscore the need for a dynamic perspective of evacuation behavior.
Moreover, modeling the evacuation decision process dynamically over many time periods with households having the ability to wait for more information, is analogous to a real-life evacuation decision situation where the National Hurricane Center (NHC) issues official forecast advisories every 6 h once a tropical depression, tropical storm, or hurricane has developed. While Fu and Wilmot (2004) utilize a sequential choice model to estimate the probability of a household evacuating or waiting in each period of their dynamic multiperiod framework, and further use their dynamic model results to provide clarification to the standard evacuation timing empirical outcomes, their research differs from ours in a number of significant ways. Importantly, we provide a theoretical model of dynamic evacuation behavior which is necessary for conducting policy analysis. Furthermore, our dynamic model is calibrated with forecast data from a number of storms across a number of locations which coincides directly with the 6 h NHC forecast advisory timeline. Lastly, we explicitly address the costs of evacuation in a household's evacuation decision. Although Regnier and Harr (2006) have developed an analogous dynamic evacuation decision model, they have done so from an emergency management perspective as opposed to the household standpoint as we have here.
This research then serves as a contrast to the existing models of household hurricane evacuation behavior, by utilizing a theoretically driven dynamic modeling approach that provides a more realistic interpretation to the multiperiod evacuation decision process through the use of forecast and evacuation cost data. As a result, through our dynamic model we can identify a representative household's optimal point in time to evacuate over a five-day forecast period, given a particular storm forecast and associated costs of evacuation. We can further flex the model to incorporate various household types such as high-damage (e.g., mobile home) versus low damage, or salaried versus hourly wage to investigate whether the optimal evacuation timing becomes earlier or later according to type, and by how much. We can also analyze how policies that change aspects of the costs of evacuating (e.g., contraflow), or the cost of not evacuating (e.g., improved structural mitigation) affect the optimal timing outcome, with the results illuminating potential unintended and/or unwanted consequences of an otherwise well-intentioned policy. Thus, our dynamic model framework allows us to begin to bridge the previously noted knowledge gap between hurricane forecasts and evacuation timing behaviors in a variety of meaningful ways.
Hurricane Evacuation Decisions as a Dynamic Process
The evacuation decision when faced by a hurricane threat has the three qualities of irreversibility, uncertainty, and the ability to wait for more information that characterize a decision process that is better understood from a dynamic modeling approach (Dixit and Pindyck 1994) . We assume that the hurricane evacuation decision is irreversible once made, and illustrate both the uncertainty inherent in a hurricane forecast and the empirical evidence demonstrating a household's ability to wait for more hurricane information. While the irreversible evacuation decision assumption may not hold in every case, e.g., severe highway congestion causing some evacuees to return, we feel it is a reasonable assumption for most evacuation situations. For example, mean evacuation distance traveled for Hurricane Ivan was 182 miles (Morrow and Gladwin 2005) ; clearly not an easily reversible distance to cover.
Uncertain Hurricane Forecasts
Once a tropical depression, tropical storm, or hurricane has developed, the NHC issues an official forecast advisory every 6 h at 5:00 a.m., 11:00 a.m., 5:00 p.m., and 11:00 p.m. Two of the most critical aspects of information contained in the NHC forecast advisory are the 12, 24, 36, 48, 72, 96 , and 120 h forecasts of an approaching hurricane's center position (track forecast), and the maximum 1 min sustained wind speeds (intensity forecast). Although the track and intensity forecast errors have improved over time, there is still a high amount of variability in the accuracy of the track and intensity forecasts themselves as the number of hours prior to landfall increases. For example, in 2004, the average track forecast error of 62 miles at 24 h out from landfall increased by nearly 420% to 323 miles at 120 h out from landfall. A more recognizable illustration of the magnitude of the track forecast errors over time is revealed in the NHC's forecast uncertainty cone where the diameter of the cone expands with forecast time, sometimes affecting four or five separate U.S. states 120 h out from potential landfall.
Given that recommended safe evacuation times for major coastal communities are at least 30 h in advance of a hurricane's expected landfall (Lindell et al. 2007) , the forecast errors highlight the significant amount of uncertainty inherent in the hurricane forecast that households use to make evacuation decisions during this recommended safe evacuation timeframe. For example, the 36 h forecast in 2005 had a track forecast error of 90 miles, and an intensity error of 15 mph. Imagine a location that is within the average error forecast cone for the 36 h forecast, but it is located 80 miles east of the forecasted center of the storm, and is therefore on the far eastern side of the cone for a hurricane moving south to north. Also, let the 36 h forecast call for an intensity of 105 mph at landfall, which is a category 2 (CAT 2) hurricane.
Assuming the storm actually stays within the cone 36 h later (70% of the time it does not; Norcross 2006), it could potentially make landfall 170 miles west of our imagined location (i.e., 90 miles west of the forecasted storm center), effectively placing our location out of harm's way. On the other hand, even if the storm does head directly toward our location it could make landfall anywhere from 90 mph to 120 mph, or from a CAT 1 up to a CAT 3 hurricane. As CAT 1 hurricanes are classified as causing minimal damage, and CAT 3 hurricanes as causing extensive damage, the difference in potential damage is significant. Undoubtedly, a household's evacuation decision 36 h from landfall knowing with certainty that a CAT 3 storm will be tracking directly over it, or a CAT 1 storm will be tracking 170 miles west of it, would be different. And the fact that the storm is forecasted to potentially fall anywhere in between these two extremes leads to inevitable uncertainty in regard to a household's decision to evacuate during this 36 h time period.
Heterogeneous Evacuation Behavior
Given the NHC track and intensity forecast uncertainty, and assuming that households in the projected path of the storm are using this information for their evacuation decision ("… almost all hurricane forecast information the public receives is a repackaged form of NHC data"; Regnier 2008), it is not surprising to see empirical evidence suggesting heterogeneous evacuation behaviors among households where some evacuate while others wait. For example, Morrow and Gladwin (2005) found that for Hurricane Ivan in 2004 more than 68 h elapsed from the time the first person evacuated to the time the last person evacuated in the Gulf region, which equates to nearly 11 NHC forecast advisories spanning the course of three days. Likewise, the cumulative evacuation timing curves that are produced as a part of FEMA and the USACE (USACE 2006b) poststorm assessments indicate heterogeneous evacuation behavior of varying degrees through a variety of S-shaped evacuation response curves. Fig. 1 presents a version of the S-shaped cumulative evacuation response curve from the 1995 Hurricane Opal poststorm assessment where despite the majority of households evacuating between 6 and 18 h before landfall, the first households to evacuate left nearly 42 h before landfall.
There are a number of potential factors affecting the observed variable timing of household evacuations. Fast, medium, and slow evacuation response rates in relation to the issuance of an official evacuation order have been observed (USACE 2006a). Thus, not only do some households wait while others evacuate, but their rate of waiting and evacuating vary as well, dependent upon either household location (Lindell et al. 2005) , or household type (Fu and Wilmot 2004) . For example, noncoastal locations typically have a slower rate of evacuation compared to coastal locations, and households with at least one household member working have a slower rate of evacuation than those households that do not. Dow and Cutter (pg. 15, 2002) state that the "majority of evacuation trips begin during normal waking hours on the 2 days prior to anticipated landfall". Fu and Wilmot (2004), and Lindell et al. (2005) also highlight heightened rates of evacuation occurring during the daylight hours, and subsequent slowdowns during the night. Lastly, Lindell et al. (2005) indicate that the steadier is the track of a storm; the earlier will evacuations be induced.
However, these factors do not apply to all general evacuation timing outcomes, nor are they able to sufficiently explain specific evacuation timing outcomes. For example, the evacuation timing graphs from Hurricane Ivan's poststorm assessment illustrate increased levels of evacuation beginning to occur during the nighttime hours, as opposed to slowdowns (Morrow and Gladwin 2005) . Dow and Cutter (2002) are at a loss to explain as to why for Hurricane Floyd in 1999 48% of evacuees left between a 9:00 a.m. to 3:00 p.m. window, with so few leaving before and after this period? Also, as no primary factor for the timing of evacuations is identified from the empirical evidence, extrapolating which factor is predominantly driving evacuation timing for a specific outcome is difficult when interactions between the various factors occur, such as the issuance of evacuation orders during daylight hours for coastal communities (Dow and Cutter 2002; Lindell et al. 2005) . Hence, to better understand and explain evacuation timing outcomes we build a realistic multiperiod dynamic model of evacuation where households have the ability to evacuate, or to wait one more time period for more information from a revised NHC hurricane forecast advisory.
Multiperiod Model of Evacuation
Generically, the dynamic multiperiod model dictates that in each NHC issued forecast advisory period households compare the costs of evacuating versus the expected costs of not evacuating stemming from the observed forecast information, and select the minimum value of these two amounts. As a result, provided the costs of evacuating represent the minimum value in a particular forecast advisory period, households evacuate, otherwise the expected costs of not evacuating are the minimum value and households wait one more time period for a revised hurricane forecast. Or, in economic terms, in each forecast advisory period households act rationally and evacuate when the expected benefits of evacuating (i.e., the avoided increased costs of evacuating next period and/or avoided personal damage costs of not evacuating) are greater than the costs of evacuating, otherwise it can be said that a positive option value to waiting exists. Landry et al. (2007) have framed their static evacuation return migration decision from a similar weighing of benefits and costs.
More specifically, we can think of households potentially affected by the storm as being placed into a discrete-time multiperiod evacuation decision situation, where each discrete evacuation decision time period is 6 h and is associated with a mutually exclusive NHC forecast advisory. While the track and intensity of the hurricane at landfall are unknown to households, we assume that the timing of a storm's landfall is known with certainty at time T, and based upon the empirical evidence presented in available evacuation response curves such as Fig. 1 , that the last safe possible time period for a household to evacuate is 6 h prior to T, denoted by T Ã . As the 120 h forecast is the maximum forecast time issued, let n ¼ 0; 1; …; 19 be the potential number of evacuation decision time periods from T Ã over the five-day forecast period such that we have ðT Ã À 19Þ; ðT Ã À 18Þ; …; ðT Ã À 1Þ; T Ã potential evacuation decision time periods.
In each (T Ã À n) evacuation decision time period, households face the binary choice of either to evacuate and incur a known cost of evacuation, or to wait one more time period for a revised hurricane forecast. We further assume that if at any (T Ã À n) period the decision has been made to evacuate; this decision is not reversible as evacuation is assumed to be immediate and evacuation costs are sunk. Moreover, given the unknown track and intensity of the hurricane at landfall this binary choice is predicated upon the track and intensity forecast information contained in the (T Ã À n) forecast advisory. We construct a hurricane forecast risk index, denoted θ ðT Ã ÀnÞ , that captures both the intensity and track forecast information into a single value that households use for their binary evacuation decision. In this way, our risk index variable is similar to the 2006 wind speed probability products issued by the NHC in that it provides a single and less complicated source of information on the probability of winds of a certain strength affecting a given location. Of course, as presented in the section on hurricane evacuation decisions as a dynamic process hurricane track and intensity forecasts contain a significant amount of uncertainty, with the degree of uncertainty decreasing as (T Ã À n) approaches T. Accordingly, the constructed risk index is a random variable which we assume follows a Markov process such that in the current period the probability that a particular realization of any of the possible j risk index values occurs, θ j ðT Ã ÀnÞ , depends only on the risk index values from the previous period.
Explicitly then for forecast advisory periods n ¼ 1; …; 19, the household evacuation decision in each (T Ã À n) period given risk index θ ðT Ã ÀnÞ is either to evacuate immediately incurring cost of evacuation c EV ðT Ã ÀnÞ , or to wait one period for more information from the expected updated forecast of the risk index conditional upon the current period forecasted risk index, ½E ðT Ã ÀnÞ ðθ ðT Ã Ànþ1Þ Þjθ ðT Ã ÀnÞ , and the possibility of evacuating during period (T Ã À n þ 1) with associated costs of evacuation c EV ðT Ã Ànþ1Þ . For n ¼ 0, the household evacuation decision in period T Ã given the risk index θ T Ã is either to evacuate immediately incurring cost of evacuation c EV ðT Ã Þ , or to wait and simply ride out the storm at T incurring the expected costs of not evacuating c N EV ðTÞ which are a function of the risk index at landfall and conditional upon
For a more technical version of this dynamic model as a formal optimal stopping problem, interested readers are referred to Czajkowski (2007) .
Model Inputs
To solve our multiperiod dynamic model of evacuation decisionmaking, three main data inputs are needed: (1) for n ¼ 0; 1; …; 19, the possible j hurricane risk indexes, θ ðT Ã ÀnÞ , and their associated probability distributions; (2) for n ¼ 0; 1; …; 19, the costs of evacuation, c EV ðT Ã ÀnÞ ; and (3) for T, the expected costs of not evacuating, c N EV ðTÞ . The construction of these inputs is detailed below.
Hurricane Risk Index
We construct our hurricane risk indexes from actual historical storm forecast advisory and realized landfall data stemming from 19 storms affecting 15 coastal locations in the To construct the hurricane forecast risk indexes, we need to combine intensity and track forecast information provided in the forecast advisories for these storms into a single value. We assume that households focus on the forecasted Saffir-Simpson Hurricane Scale (SSHS) category level of the hurricane as opposed to the storm's specific wind speed when thinking about the hurricane's intensity, and therefore given the specific sustained wind speed values of the center of the storm provided in the forecast advisory, we utilize the associated SSHS category (CAT) 1-5 values for the risk index intensity forecast component. In addition, for storms with forecasted wind speeds not at hurricane strength, we have an associated 0 CAT value. Strike probabilities are the percentage chance that the center of the storm will cross within 75 miles of a specified location and are issued in conjunction with the forecast advisories (although as of 2006 the strike probabilities are no longer issued, replaced by the wind speed probability products). Similarly, we assume that households focus on their specific location strike probability as opposed to the exact center of the storm latitude and longitude coordinates provided in the forecast advisory when thinking about the hurricane's track, and therefore utilize strike probabilities for the risk index track forecast component. The 15 coastal locations are given explicit strike probabilities in Hurrevac and the NHC forecast archives. By using the forecasted intensity CAT levels in conjunction with the location strike probabilities, for each of the 19 storms we construct hurricane forecast risk indexes for each of the 15 coastal locations along the Gulf of Mexico for each (T Ã À n) period with n ¼ 0; 1; …; 19, and for the realized landfall period T.
At landfall, our constructed risk index variable is straightforward to illustrate as θ is no longer a forecast, but rather a realized value for any number of identified locations. For example, in 2005 Hurricane Dennis made landfall in Pensacola, Florida as a CAT 3 hurricane with corresponding period T realized CAT intensity level ¼ 3 for all 15 locations, and strike probability ¼ 100% for Pensacola, and ¼ 0% for all other 14 locations. Therefore, θ T ¼ 3 for Pensacola-100% ðstrike probabilityÞ × 3ðCATÞ. However, θ T ¼ 0 for all other locations along the Gulf Coast that at some point had the possibility of being struck by Hurricane Dennis, such as Port Arthur, Texas-0% ðstrike probabilityÞ × 3ðCATÞ. Thus, at landfall θ T not only includes constructed values 1 through 5 corresponding to the five SSHS CAT levels, but also a constructed value 0 that can either correspond to actual CAT 1-5 hurricanes that do not make landfall at a particular location, or storms that make landfall at a particular location but fall below the CAT 1 hurricane designation.
Although similar to the θ T discretization, the discretization of θ ðT Ã ÀnÞ for n ¼ 0; 1; …; 19 is more complex. First, for each specific forecasted wind speed in each 12, 24, 36, 48, 72, 96 , and 120 h intensity forecast of each storm forecast advisory, an average range of probable wind speed values is determined through the use of the associated average intensity errors from 1996-2005. For example, a 126 mph (CAT 3) wind speed was forecasted in the 36 h intensity forecast of the July 9, 2005, 5:00 am Hurricane Dennis advisory (advisory #19 where mph converted from knots). Given the average 36 h intensity forecast errors, this specific forecasted CAT 3 wind speed value from a probabilistic perspective is a CAT 3 65% of the time, and a CAT 4 35% of the time. Next, these determined average range of probable wind speeds for each 12, 24, 36, 48, 72, 96 , and 120 h forecast are combined with the associated strike probability for each location (total strike probability provided was utilized regardless of the specific forecast hour). For example, the July 9, 2005, 5:00 a.m. advisory gave Pensacola, Florida a 32% total strike probability. Combining this strike probability with the 36 h average range of probable wind speeds results in a 68% chance that Hurricane Dennis will miss Pensacola (the center of the storm will not come within 75 mi), but if it strikes Pensacola, there is a 21% chance it will strike as a CAT 3 hurricane, or an 11% chance it will strike as a CAT 4. Lastly, the appropriate 12, 24, 36, 48, 72, 96 , and 120 h forecast from each advisory is associated with the known landfall timing of the storm, and is assigned the related multiperiod model (T Ã À n) period. For example, given landfall at July 10, 2005 at 3:00 p.m., the appropriate (T Ã À 5) forecast from the July 9, 2005, 5:00 a.m. advisory is the 36 h forecast.
Combining all of this information, risk indexes per storm, location, and period are calculated by multiplying the probability of a strike by CAT level for the selected landfall forecast periods by the 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 SSHS CAT levels. Table 3 provides an example of the (T Ã À n) period, n ¼ 0; 1; …; 11, generated risk indexes for Pensacola, for Hurricane Dennis. For example, the (T Ã À 5) risk index is estimated by ð0 × :68Þ þ ð1 × :0Þ þ ð2 × :0Þ þ ð3 × :21Þ þð4 × :11Þ þ ð5 × :0Þ ¼ 1:07. In this way we are weighing the higher CAT storms more heavily, and we assume this is appropriate given the exponential increase of damages along the SSHS. Table 3 illustrates that although our generated risk indexes are based upon the SSHS, the uncertainty in the intensity and track information does not allow for a direct comparison. For instance, the actual (T Ã À 5) forecast is predicting a CAT 3 hurricane (126 mph) making landfall somewhere in the Gulf region. However, the constructed risk index by location which incorporates the uncertainty of the track and the average intensity errors for a 36 h forecast, equates to a 1.07 value for Pensacola at the (T Ã À 5) evacuation decision period. For Pensacola, the risk index evolves from 0.54 at (T Ã À 11) to 3.76 at (T Ã ), with landfall being 3.00 at T. For comparison purposes, the risk index for Iberia Parish in Louisiana evolves from 0.18 at (T Ã À 11), to 0.12 at (T Ã À 1), and finally 0.0 at (T Ã ).
Because these constructed risk index values are random variables that we assume follow a Markov process, related Markov transition probability matrices are also constructed for each (T Ã À n) period. For example, given a T Ã risk index value of θ T Ã within the range of [2-2.5], this value has the probability of transitioning into a θ T value at landfall of 0 ¼ 67%, 1 ¼ 5%, 2 ¼ 20%, 3 ¼ 8%, 4 ¼ 0%, 5 ¼ 0%. To construct these per period matrices, the 15 specific site hurricane forecast risk indexes are aggregated by year, and the yearly probability matrices from 1992-2005 are then aggregated into the final probability transition matrices per each period. Because data limitations and maximum strike probabilities are constrained by the NHC to be 60-80%, 35-50%, 20-25%, 13-18%, and 10% for the 12, 24, 36, 48, and 72 h forecasts respectively, as n becomes larger, more risk indexes with unavailable and/ or undefined values become more persistent in our probability transition matrices. For example, in period (T Ã À 4) the maximum risk index value is (1.0-1.5), while for period (T Ã À 11) the maximum risk index value is (0.5-0.75). A complete listing and more specific details on the construction of the hurricane risk indexes and their associated probability transition matrices is provided in Czajkowski (2007) .
Costs of Evacuation
The costs of evacuation include evacuation travel and time costs, direct costs incurred while away (food, lodging, entertainment), and lost wages (Whitehead 2003) . Although some of these immediate evacuation costs, such as lost wages and portions of direct costs, may actually decrease with waiting as t approaches T, we assume that certain costs, e.g., the crowdedness of the roads, distance needed to travel for adequate lodging, gasoline scarcity, etc., will increase rapidly enough so as to offset these declining costs. Therefore, we assume that the longer a household waits to evacuate, the more difficult, and hence more expensive the overall evacuation will become such that the costs of evacuation are increasing as (T Ã À n) approaches T. Indeed, if c EV ðT Ã ÀnÞ are not increasing over time, there would be an incentive for households to simply wait until the last possible minute to evacuate. As we have already seen, the empirical evidence from the S-shaped evacuation response curves does not point to such a last minute evacuation result for all households.
We use the CAT 3 Hurricane Bonnie evacuation costs produced by Whitehead (2003) and the evacuation costs/data from Hurricanes Ivan (CAT 4), Charley (CAT 3), Frances (CAT 2), and Jeanne (CAT 3) produced by USACE (2006b) to derive a household's average costs of evacuation given a CAT 3 storm. To incorporate how these evacuation costs change over time we make the following assumptions: (1) travel and travel time costs from (T Ã À 19) to T Ã and direct costs from only (T Ã À 3) to T Ã to reflect the scarcity of items such as food, lodging, and gasoline when waiting until 24 h prior to landfall, increase following the increases occurring in the average cumulative timing of evacuations across a number of existing studies, i.e., based upon how many other people are on the road; (2) direct costs prior to (T Ã À 3) are steady per day, but decrease between days; and (3) lost income costs for (T Ã À 19) to T Ã are steady per day, but decrease between days. The specific numeric results of the costs increases and decreases by cost category following from our assumptions for periods (T Ã À 11) to T Ã are presented in Table 4 . From Table 4 , overall costs of evacuation for a CAT 3 hurricane increase from $454 for evacuation at period (T Ã À 11) to $526 for evacuation at period T Ã , but are not increasing linearly. In fact, we actually see a decline in overall costs between periods (T Ã À 8) and (T Ã À 7), and between periods (T Ã À 4) and (T Ã À 3).
Thus far, the overall increasing costs of evacuation that we have determined are for a CAT 3 hurricane. But we also further assume that these costs would be less for CAT 1 and 2 and more for CAT 4 and 5 hurricanes as higher CAT levels induce more evacuees. We use data from Lindell et al. (2002) on the predicted increases in the number of cars and associated number of hours to evacuate along the Texas Gulf Coast for CAT 1 to CAT 5 hurricanes to estimate the varying levels of average CAT 1 to CAT 5 evacuation costs from our derived average CAT 3 evacuation cost base. Fig. 2 illustrates the combined results of our cost of evacuation methodology. The difference in evacuation costs are most significant between moving from minor hurricanes (CAT 1 and 2) to a major hurricane, and again the declines in overall costs for periods (T Ã À 7) and (T Ã À 3) are clearly illustrated. Lastly, the derived costs of evacuation for all periods need to be modified to coincide with the defined risk index levels. A further detailed account of the derivation of the costs of evacuation is provided in Czajkowski (2007) .
Expected Costs of Not Evacuating (Personal Hurricane Damage)
If a household chooses not to evacuate at T Ã , and given that the hurricane ultimately makes landfall at their location, they will be forced to ride out the storm which has an associated probability of being injured, or even killed. We use existing data from the Multihazard Mitigation Council's (MMC) study to assess future savings from implementing mitigation activities related to natural hazards (MMC 2005) to assign these probabilities for CAT 1 to CAT 5 hurricanes, and estimate the expected costs of not evacuating from a hurricane (i.e., the value of avoided injury/death). As part of the study, cost of injury data and rates of injury statistics due to hurricanes were collected. We use both of these pieces of information to generate our costs of not evacuating. The cost of injuries used in their study (converted to 2004 dollars) are: minor ¼ $6;303, moderate ¼ $51;471, serious ¼ $189;076, severe ¼ $619;478, and critical ¼ $2;521; 008. Actual hurricane injury rates for three hurricanes were provided in the report: Andrew (CAT 3 in Louisiana) À0:2%; Opal (CAT 3) À0:0%; and Isabel (CAT 2) À0:9%.
From the existing rates of injury, we take a conservative probability of injury for CAT 3 storms to be 0.45%. We further use the Table 4 . Increasing/Decreasing Evacuation Costs for CAT 3 Hurricane fact that damages along the SSHS are generally thought to follow an exponential form to ascertain our probabilities of injury for CAT 1 ¼ 0:050%, CAT 2 ¼ 0:200%, CAT 3 ¼ 0:45%, CAT 4 ¼ 0:85%, and CAT 5 ¼ 0:95% hurricanes. The generated probabilities of injury from hurricanes are then multiplied by each of the cost of injury values to obtain an expected cost of not evacuating by CAT level. The expected costs of not evacuating are presented in Table 5 , with costs ranging from $1,694 for a CAT 1 to $32,182 for a CAT 5. Concerning our derived expected costs of not evacuating: first, we make no distinction between perceived costs and actual expected costs of not evacuating, assuming that perceived costs are unbiased estimates of actual costs across all evacuees. Secondly, we have assumed that the probability of injury by each CAT level is the same for all types of injuries. For example, in a CAT 3 storm we have assumed the probability of incurring a minor injury is 0.45%, and that the probability of incurring a critical injury is also 0.45%. This is a limitation stemming from our available data. Furthermore, we have not made any distinction for the probability of injury depending upon location. Both of these issues should be addressed in future research. Thirdly, we have assumed that the probability of injury from a tropical storm is 0.0%, and therefore the expected cost is $0 despite the fact that tropical storms have produced injuries and deaths. Lastly, we have abstracted away from explicitly accounting for fatality probabilities and fatality avoided damages for two reasons: (1) cost of injuries from the critical severity level ¼ $2:5 million and therefore easily fall within traditional value of statistical life estimates of $1-10 million; and (2) probability of death from a hurricane is low compared to the injury probabilities above. For example, Hurricane Andrew (CAT 5) killed 14 people out of 1.9 million, or a fatality rate of. 000007368 (MMC 2005) . As hurricanes average 20 deaths per year in the U.S., this would be a relatively high rate. 
Solution and Results

General Solution and Results
By using the previous model, input of the multiperiod dynamic model of evacuation is solved through backward recursion from period T Ã , the last safe possible time to evacuate, for a general household in the Gulf of Mexico region (see Czajkowski 2007 for a more technical description of this solution). The intuition behind the solution to the multiperiod dynamic model is that for certain forms of c EV ðT Ã ÀnÞ a unique cutoff for households exists where waiting is optimal on one side of the forecast, and evacuating on the other. Fig. 3 illustrates the solved dynamic model evacuation cutoff result for period T Ã only with all the T Ã risk index values represented along the x-axis and the dollar value at time T Ã of having a forecasted risk index of θ ðT Ã Þ represented along the y-axis. By moving along the x-axis of Fig. 3 we see that in period T Ã it is optimal for an average household in our Gulf of Mexico region to evacuate for storms that have a forecast risk index ≥ 1:0 because to the right of this risk index value the expected costs of not evacuating are greater than the costs of evacuating in period T Ã . In other words, an evacuation cutoff point exists in period T Ã for forecast risk index values ≥ 1:0, where waiting is optimal on one side of the forecast, and evacuating on the other.The maximum risk index for period T Ã is 4.0. Fig. 4 presents the specific θ ðT Ã ÀnÞ evacuation cutoff results for all (T Ã À n) periods, n ¼ 0; 1; …; 11, with time to landfall represented along the x-axis and the forecast risk index values represented along the y-axis. Note, no specific dollar value is represented in this figure as was the case in Fig. 3 . In addition to the specific θ ðT Ã ÀnÞ evacuation cutoff result for each (T Ã À n) periods, n ¼ 0; 1; …; 11, the maximum risk index determined for each of these periods is also presented. Two things should be readily apparent from this figure: 1) each discrete-time period does not have an associated evacuation region; and 2) the maximum risk index value is increasing over time as the storm is making its way closer to landfall moving from (T Ã À 11) to (T Ã ) on the x-axis.
The specified evacuation region in Fig. 4 is the area above the evacuation cutoff line but below the maximum risk index line. In forecast advisory periods (T Ã À 2) to T Ã the evacuation region for an average household at a representative Gulf of Mexico location corresponds to: 1:0 ≤ forecast risk index < maximum risk Index value. For example, if the (T Ã À 1) forecast risk index ¼ 1:5 for one of the 15 specified Gulf of Mexico locations, it is rational for an average household in this location to be evacuating during this (T Ã À 1) time period as 1:5 > 1:0. Likewise, if the (T Ã À 1) forecast risk index ¼ 0:5 for one of the 15 specified Gulf of Mexico locations, it is rational for an average household in this location to wait one more time period for the revised T Ã hurricane forecast as 0:5 < 1:0. In period (T Ã À 3) the evacuation region corresponds to: 0:75 ≤ forecast risk index < maximum risk index ¼ 1:5. In forecast advisory time periods (T Ã À 11) to (T Ã À 4) an evacuation cutoff line does not exist, and therefore it is always optimal for an average household to wait one more time period for a revised hurricane forecast during these time periods, i.e., prior to 24 h out from landfall. Again, given that recommended safe evacuation times for major coastal communities are at least 30 h in advance of a hurricane's expected landfall, these optimal private household evacuation results do not coincide well with the desired socially optimal evacuation timing outcome. One potential way of thinking about this issue is that early household evacuation provides external benefits to other households in terms of reduced evacuation costs later. However, these external benefits are likely ignored in the private household evacuation decision. Similar to the undersupply of other private goods that provide external benefits such as the level of education, incentives need to be provided to households to induce early evacuation. A preliminary assessment of potential incentives is provided in the policy analysis section of this paper.
The maximum risk index value increases over time because the track uncertainty is conveyed in the forecast advisories via the strike probabilities. For example, given low strike probabilities three days out from landfall, a CAT 5 storm that is just making its way into the Gulf of Mexico at this time is not able to achieve a risk index value > 0:75. However, as the storm makes its way closer to landfall and the strike probabilities become higher, the risk index value increases over time. These rising risk index values help provide the intuition behind the nonexistent evacuation region prior to period (T Ã À 3). One can simply compare the evacuation cost results of Fig. 2 versus the maximum risk index values in Fig. 4 to clearly see that evacuation costs are sufficiently high 72 h out from landfall, whereas the risk values and consequently the expected costs of not evacuating are constrained during these earlier time periods. Accordingly, households have an incentive to wait for a revised hurricane forecast during earlier time periods as the model solution formally shows.
Empirical Robustness
Although our results thus far have been general, i.e., for an average household at an representative location in our defined Gulf of Mexico region, we can use available evacuation timing graphs and our per period, per location constructed risk indexes to evaluate how well our model does in explaining actual evacuation timing outcomes for particular storms. Hurricane Opal: In October, 1995 Hurricane Opal made landfall as a strong CAT 3 hurricane over Pensacola, Florida. Fig. 1 illustrates the aggregated evacuation timing for evacuees from Alabama (Baldwin and Mobile counties) and FL (Bay, Escambia, Okaloosa, Santa Rosa, and Walton counties) from the 1995 postassessment report (USACE 2006b). Fig. 1 shows the 50th percentile evacuee leaving during period (T Ã À 1), and the slope of the curve steepening considerably over this time period. Forecasts for Opal from periods (T Ã À 11) to (T Ã À 3) called for a minor hurricane at landfall, but forecasts from (T Ã À 2) to T Ã called for a major hurricane at landfall. Table 6 presents the per period risk indexes by location, ranked in descending order by T Ã , for Hurricane Opal. Following from the general results of our multiperiod model, evacuation is rational beginning in period (T Ã À 1) for average households in our defined locations of Pensacola (Escambia County) and Panama City (Bay County), Florida, and for Mobile (Mobile County), Alabama, as risk indexes for these locations are all ≥ 1:0 and are highlighted in Table 6 . These results coincide well with the actual evacuation timing as illustrated in Fig. 1 , where the steepest slope of the evacuation timing curve and the 50th percentile are occurring in period (T Ã À 1), and overall evacuation is really beginning in earnest during this timeframe. In this case, the results of our multiperiod model offer an explanation for the relatively late (12 h prior to landfall for a major hurricane) evacuation response.
Similar exercises are performed for Hurricanes Ivan, Charley and Lili in Czajkowski (2007) with comparable positive results for Ivan and Charley and mixed results for Lili. In all 4 cases, evacuation is predicted only in those locations where actual evacuation occurred according to the poststorm assessment survey data. For example, Hurricane Charley made landfall in Southwest Florida, and our model predicts evacuations for locations close to the eventual landfall such as Tampa, while not predicting evacuations for locations not in close proximity such as Mobile, Alabama. In 3 of the 4 cases, our model correctly predicts evacuation for an average household, which correspond to the 50th percentile on the evacuation timing graphs. However, the 10-50% of cumulative evacuations occurring between periods (T Ã À 8) and (T Ã À 4) for Hurricanes Lili and Ivan are not predicted from our model, at least not for an average household.
Range of Solutions by Various Household Types
In addition to evaluating our model's robustness against actual evacuation timing outcomes for an average household, we can also evaluate it through expected evacuation outcomes by various household types. For example, let us assume two household types: high-damage (e.g., coastal location or mobile home) versus low damage (e.g., inland location or nonmobile home), where high (low) damage households have a greater (lower) probability of being injured than the probabilities from the model inputs section provided in Table 5 . Intuitively, compared to an average damage household type, high (low) damage household types should evacuate earlier (later) in general and also be more (less) willing to evacuate for lower (higher) risk index storms. (T*-11) (T*-10) (T*-9) (T*-8) (T*-7) (T*-6) (T*-5) (T*-4) (T*-3) (T*-2) (T*-1) T*
Time to Landfall Forecast Risk Index
Evac Cutoff Max Risk Index
Evacuation Region
Waiting Region 3 days out 2 days out 1 day out Table 7 summarizes the model results for high and low damage household types along with model result summaries for various other household types such as high cost versus low cost households and tourists. For example, we flex the dynamic model to incorporate high damage household types by increasing the probability of injury by five times that of the average household. Consequently, the costs of not evacuating increase for high damage household types and the evacuation region generally expands for lower risk indexes in periods (T Ã À 3) to T Ã . Furthermore, if the probability of injury has increased significantly, one would also expect the number of evacuees to increase leading to higher rates of evacuation costs increases for all periods compared to those used for an average household. When the higher probability of injury is combined with evacuation cost increases two times that of the general model, not only does the evacuation region expand for periods (T Ã À 3) to T Ã , but earlier evacuation is induced for periods (T Ã À 7) to (T Ã À 5). From Table 7 we see that overall, results from the multiperiod model do a good job of predicting expected evacuation timing outcomes for various household types. What's more, these predicted results have the potential to explain the 10-50% of cumulative evacuations occurring between periods (T Ã À 8) and (T Ã À 4) for Hurricanes Lili and Ivan that our average household results from the general multiperiod model could not. However, we do note the need for caution in by using predictive validity as a criterion for assessing a model's adequacy.
Policy Implications
The dynamic modeling framework is most relevant in beginning to understand the implications of policies that plausibly affect the timing of household evacuations. In this section we provide a preliminary assessment of a number of potential hurricane policies meant to affect the timing of evacuation. to T Ã , and earlier evacuation is induced for periods (T Ã À 7) to (T Ã À 5) Low damage Later evacuation and less willing to evacuate for higher risk indexes Probability of injury decreases by half Evacuation region generally contracts for higher risk indexes in periods (T Ã À 3) to T Ã Probability of injury decrease by half and half the rate of evacuation cost increase Not much change
High evacuation cost
Later evacuation and less willing to evacuate for higher risk indexes Overall cost of evacuation increase by 2 times Evacuation region generally contracts for higher risk indexes in periods (T Ã À 3) to T Ã Overall cost of evacuation increase by 2 times and half the rate of evacuation cost increases Evacuation region contracts even further for higher risk indexes in periods (T Ã À 3) to T Ã
Low evacuation cost
Earlier evacuation and more willing to evacuate for lower risk indexes Overall cost of evacuation decrease by 1=2 Evacuation region expands only slightly for lower risk indexes in period T Ã Overall cost of evacuation decrease by 1=2 and two times the rate of evacuation cost increases Evacuation region expand for periods (T Ã À 3) to T Ã , and earlier evacuation is induced for periods (T Ã À 7) to (T Ã À 5)
Overall Evacuation Cost Reduction
For policy makers and emergency managers interested in having households evacuate as early as possible, the costs of evacuation are a key constraint. Given that the costs of evacuation consist of the various components of direct, travel-related, and lost income costs, a variety of policy initiatives may be available to reduce costs. We use the dynamic model to test the effect of reducing the overall costs of evacuation equally across all components by 25, 50, and 80%, while holding all other variables constant. The results indicate that large cost reductions are needed, as much as 80% of the original, to induce evacuation for lower risk indexes, and even these significant cost reductions do not induce earlier evacuation for periods prior to (T Ã À 3). This suggests that a policy aimed at simply reducing the overall costs of evacuation does not induce early evacuation. Potentially then, a more targeted evacuation cost reduction, or a nonevacuation cost-based policy such as an improved forecast, may be a more appropriate strategy to achieve earlier evacuations by the average household.
Targeted Evacuation Cost Reduction
The costs of lost income are one component of evacuation costs that potentially can be targeted by policy makers as not only are these costs the largest component of our specified evacuation costs, but they also delineate two separate household types with someone in the household having to work in hourly versus salaried worker household types. We assume that salaried workers have more flexibility in their decision to evacuate with any missed days of work not equating to lost income, which we assume not be true for hourly workers. Fig. 5 illustrates the results from our multiperiod model with the costs of lost income eliminated, demonstrating a divergent salaried versus hourly worker outcome. As the evacuation region expands significantly from one to two days out from landfall, we see that when the costs of lost income are eliminated from the evacuation decision it easier to evacuate earlier.
What other possible targeted policies might make evacuation decisions more equitable such as a focus on the reduction of direct costs? For example, assume a policy that focuses on reducing much of the direct costs of evacuation through the use of improved shelters that provide meals, showers, etc. Households that use the improved shelters (which we assume to typically be hourly worker household types) have the possibility of having much of their direct costs eliminated. However, when direct costs are completely eliminated from the multiperiod model, little earlier evacuation is induced. In this case, a policy that gives hourly workers more evacuation options once they have evacuated is not effective in minimizing the divergent salaried versus hourly worker outcome. In order for the divergence to be addressed, policies need to be directed at making it easier for hourly workers to leave, such as a policy that provides incentives for employers to pay hourly workers for lost work time due to hurricane evacuations.
Cost Profile
Other more targeted policies intended to induce earlier evacuation could focus on reducing the rates at which direct and travel-related costs increase over time such as the use of contraflow or the increased availability of shelters. Fig. 6 illustrates the affect on evacuation timing if these types of policies are implemented and our assumed rates of per period cost increases from (T Ã À 11) to T Ã are decreased by half. Decreasing the rate at which the costs of evacuation increase over time leads to a contraction of the evacuation region, and also to no earlier evacuation being induced prior to period (T Ã À 3). This outcome helps to explain the empirical result that Morrow and Gladwin (2005) found for Hurricane Ivan where when contraflow was implemented, a quarter of respondents indicated this made them less likely to evacuate. Importantly, these results also show that when the ability to wait is a part of household's decision to evacuate, timing results may run opposite of the intended policy goals.
Conversely, when the rates of travel and direct costs increase over time, earlier evacuation is induced. Fig. 6 also illustrates this result assuming the rates have increased by two times our original assumptions, with earlier evacuation shown for periods (T Ã À 7) to 0.00 1.00 2.00 3.00 4.00 5.00 (T*-11) (T*-10) (T*-9) (T*-8) (T*-7) (T*-6) (T*-5) (T*-4) (T*-3) (T*-2) (T*-1) T*
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Costs with Income Costs without Income Max Risk Index Expanded Evacuation Region Fig. 5 . Optimal evacuation region excluding lost income costs (T Ã À 5). Paradoxically, this result also coincides with another Hurricane Ivan finding discussed by Morrow and Gladwin (2005) where the implementation of the contraflow actually caused additional problems in traffic flow (which can be construed as a rate increase), and 60% of those evacuees that used the contraflow route indicated that they would leave earlier next time.
Value of an Improved Forecast
Recall that the evacuation response for Hurricane Opal was relatively late with the vast majority of evacuations occurring within 12 h of the actual hurricane landfall. From Table 6 , there are two ways that an earlier evacuation say in period (T Ã À 3) could have occurred for the eventual landfall locations of Pensacola or Panama City: (1) lowering of the general (T Ã À 3) evacuation cutoff point from risk index values ≥ 0:75 to risk index values ≥ 0:50, the current Pensacola/Panama City risk index values; or (2) increasing the location specific (T Ã À 3) risk index values achieved for Pensacola and Panama City to ≥ 0:75, the current evacuation cutoff point.
The previous nontargeted cost of evacuation analysis suggests that to lower the general (T Ã À 3) cutoff point to risk index values ≥ 0:50, the overall evacuation costs need to be reduced by 80%, or a cost of $307 per household. With approximately 50,000 households in these two locations, total cost reductions necessary to induce an earlier evacuation 24 h out from landfall therefore equate to approximately $15 million. The NHC strike probabilities for Panama City and Pensacola in this period were 22% and 23% respectively. If these strike probabilities had been increased to 31%, risk index values would have been high enough for it to be rational for household to evacuate during period (T Ã À 3), i.e., ≥ 0:75. Therefore, in the case of Hurricane Opal, the difference between the cost necessary to improve the strike probabilities from 22% to 31% 24 h before landfall, and the $15 million cost of evacuation reduction is the value of an improved forecast that induces an earlier evacuation 24 h out from landfall.
Conclusions
This paper addresses a limitation to existing household hurricane evacuation modeling aspects, and hence an understanding of the household hurricane evacuation, by developing a dynamic model of hurricane evacuation behavior. In every potential evacuation time period prior to the actual hurricane landfall within the dynamic model, a household's optimal choice is to either evacuate, or to wait one more time period for a revised NHC hurricane forecast. The dynamic framework reflects a realistic multiperiod setup incorporating existing forecast and evacuation cost data to explain actual evacuation behavior for our designated Gulf of Mexico region. Despite a number of assumptions made in developing the model along with data limitations, the evacuation timing results from our general model do a relatively good job of understanding and explaining actual evacuation timing outcomes by location from specific hurricanes, and expected evacuation timing outcomes for various household types. Consequently and most significantly, the dynamic framework is used to explore a number of relevant policy questions that plausibly affect the timing of household evacuations, sometimes providing the rationalization for seemingly counterintuitive poststorm assessment evacuation results. For example, would building more and better shelters induce earlier evacuation? Or, why does implementing contraflow actually cause some households to be less likely to evacuate? Thus, this analysis has begun to address the need for modeling hurricane evacuation behavioral responses in more precise and comprehensive ways, laying a foundation for continued development in this regard. (T*-11) (T*-10) (T*-9) (T*-8) (T*-7) (T*-6) (T*-5) (T*-4) (T*-3) (T*-2) (T*-1) T* 
